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{Constitutional Jurisprudence}

WHY BROCCOLI?

LIMITING PRINCIPLES AND
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN THE HEALTH CARE CASE

forthcoming in UCLA Law Review, volume 61
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Mark Rosen

Professor of Law

BA, Yale College
JD, Harvard Law School

Christopher Schmidt
Assistant Professor of Law

BA, Dartmouth College
JD, Harvard Law School
MA, History, Harvard University
PhD, History of American Civilization, Harvard University

M

ark Rosen joined IIT Chicago-Kent in the fall of 1999, and was a Visiting Professor at
the University of Minnesota Law School in 2005–2006. Prior to joining the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty, Professor Rosen was a Bigelow Fellow and lecturer in law at the University
of Chicago Law School. From 1994 to 1997, he was an attorney at the law firm of Foley,
Hoag & Eliot in Boston, where he focused on complex federal court litigation. Professor
Rosen’s scholarly interests include constitutional law, state and local government, civil procedure, conflicts of law, federal courts, and Federal Indian law. He teaches constitutional law,
civil procedure, state and local government law, Federal Indian Law, conflicts of law, and
contracts. For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/mrosen
www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/mrosen.

C

hristopher Schmidt joined the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty in 2008. He is also a faculty
fellow at the American Bar Foundation and the editor of Law & Social Inquiry. He has
received fellowships from the American Society for Legal History and the Miller Center of
Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and was selected to present at the 2012 Junior
Faculty Forum at Harvard Law School. He teaches in the areas of constitutional law, legal
history, comparative constitutional law, and sports law. He is currently working on two book
projects, one on the history and legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, the other on the
student sit-in movement of 1960. For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/
e
.
faculty/cschmidt
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Why Broccoli?

Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism
in the Health Care Case
BY MARK ROSEN & CHRISTOPHER SCHMIDT

B

roccoli made its appearance
early in the debate over the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA). At first it seemed a joke, one of
those spasms of political hyperbole that
seem to emerge in any heated public debate. At issue was the constitutional authority by which the U.S. Congress could
require people to purchase health insurance—the individual mandate provision
of the ACA . If the Constitution were read
to allow the federal government to require
individuals to purchase health insurance,
critics asked, was there anything to prevent the government from requiring people to do all sorts of things against their
will? Could the government demand that
people purchase broccoli?
No one in Congress had ever seriously considered such a broccoli mandate,
of course. The issue at hand was health
care and insurance, not green vegetables.
Broccoli was a pure hypothetical of the
slippery-slope, reductio ad absurdum variety. Yet the broccoli hypothetical proved
to be a surprisingly persistent presence in

the constitutional challenge to health care.
Conservative lawyers pressed the broccoli
analogy (along with other hypothetical
mandates) in their numerous legal challenges to the ACA, and broccoli found its
way into the text of several lower court
opinions. When the U.S. Supreme Court
Justices pressed the broccoli hypothetical
on Solicitor General Verrilli during oral
arguments, the only surprise was that he
did not have a crisp response to the question everyone fully expected would be
asked.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius (NFIB) sealed broccoli’s immortality in constitutional jurisprudence.
The three main written opinions included
twelve references to broccoli and five separate discussions of the broccoli mandate’s
legal implications. Five Justices cited the
government’s inability to provide a satisfying answer to the broccoli hypothetical
as a justification for creating a novel limitation on Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers and for concluding that the ACA’s

*Excerpted from Mark Rosen and Christopher Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Decision, forthcoming in volume 61 of the UCLA Law Review (2013).
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mandate exceeded that limit. Even the dissenters to the Commerce Clause holding
felt compelled to respond to what Justice
Ginsburg referred to as “the broccoli horrible.”
The Justices’ consensus concerning
broccoli’s significance in their constitutional analysis of the ACA conceals an
as-of-yet unrecognized puzzle: All the
Justices took for granted that the Court
had to provide a response to the broccoli
hypothetical. To appreciate the puzzle,
three points must be recognized. First,
the broccoli hypothetical was, at base,
a provocative way to demand a limiting
principle; any answer as to why Congress
had power to enact the ACA’s mandate,
but not the hypothetical broccoli mandate,
would require the identification of such
a principle. Second, the ACA’s mandate
raised a novel constitutional question;
Congress had never before used its Commerce Clause powers to require virtually
everybody to purchase something. Third,
a survey of constitutional history shows
that when confronted with novel constitutional questions, the Court almost always
declines to provide limiting principles
that define the metes and bounds of the
constitutional power or right at issue.

“We argue that popular
mobilization against the ACA . . .
served to link the extrajudicial
constitutional movement
mobilized against the law and
the constitutional challenge
taking place in the courts.”
Instead, the Court typically answers the
question in a narrow, localist fashion that
analyzes and answers the constitutionality
of only the governmental action that is be[ 4 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

fore the Court. Indeed, the Court typically
avoids any attempt at identifying a limiting principle until it has considered the
constitutional question many times, and
not infrequently it declines to ever identify
a limiting principle.
So here is the puzzle: Why did the
NFIB Court assume that it could uphold
the individual mandate on Commerce
Clause grounds only if a limiting principle
could be found? Indeed, why did not even
a single Justice suggest that the broccoli
hypothetical need not be answered—that
is to say, that a limiting principle need not
have been provided—to decide this case?
The answer to this puzzle lies outside
the Court. It requires attention to dynamics of constitutional development that
scholars have examined under the label
“popular constitutionalism.” What made
this case unique was the exceptional level
of demand from outside the courts that
the limiting-principles question play a
central role in resolving the constitutional
challenge. By the time the case reached
the Supreme Court, a robust public engagement with the constitutional issues
had already developed. This engagement
was the product of the Tea Party movement, which was committed to a belief
that the ACA violated core constitutional
principles. The Republican presidential
primary fueled these Tea Party sentiments
with the contenders’ universal condemnation of the ACA. Lower court rulings
that struck down the individual mandate
animated these sentiments even further.
At the center of this roiling public debate
were the broccoli hypothetical and the
difficult questions it raised about limiting
principles. These popular constitutional
demands, which revolved around the singularly evocative broccoli hypothetical,
structured public expectations about the
stakes of the ACA challenge to such a degree that it would have been notable had

Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism

the Court chosen not to go beyond the
facts of the case to engage with the limits
of congressional power.

T

he story of broccoli, limiting principles, and the ACA challenge raises difficult questions about the relationship between popular constitutional demands and
the courts. What are the costs and benefits
of allowing extrajudicial pressures to influence the Supreme Court’s evaluation of
constitutional issues? In this Article, we
argue that popular mobilization against
the ACA—including the demand for a
response to the broccoli hypothetical—
served to link the extrajudicial constitutional movement mobilized against the
law and the constitutional challenge taking place in the courts. While much of the
critique of the mandate outside the courts
focused on ways in which it violated basic principles of liberty and free choice, a
straight rights-based claim, such as one
based on the Due Process Clause, never
had a chance inside the courts. The legal
issue before the courts was, strictly speaking, a question of congressional power and
federalism, not individual liberty. Thus
there was something of a disconnect between the technical ways in which courts
engaged with the constitutional challenge—as a question of structural limits
and enumerated powers—and the ways in
which most Americans thought about the
constitutional issues—as a question of individual liberty versus government regulation. The ACA litigation offers a striking
example of how doctrinal analysis can fail
to map onto public sentiment about the
constitutional stakes.
How the courts approach a particular constitutional issue often differs from
how the public views the same issue of
course. Yet in the ACA case, this dynamic
was particularly notable because the difference was so significant and the public

interest in the constitutional dispute was
so intense. The hypothetical broccoli
mandate shrunk this disconnect in a way
that advantaged the law’s challengers. In
effect, broccoli served a two-way signaling
function between judicial actors (lawyers
and judges) and nonjudicial actors (political actors and the larger public). Its resonance in the political arena signaled to
those litigating the case the importance of
liberty concerns in the larger extrajudicial
constitutional battle over the ACA. And
it provided judicial actors a symbol with
which to demonstrate their sympathy with
this liberty-based critique of the health insurance mandate. The fact that the Court
identified a concern with protecting individual liberty as a core principle of its
commerce power analysis, and did so at
least partly in response to extrajudicial demands from critics of the law, is a classic
example of the generative, responsive potential of popular constitutionalism.
But another, more problematic, dynamic of popular constitutionalism is at
play in the ACA case. In NFIB, popular
constitutional demands not only pressured
the Court to more squarely confront the
potential liberty costs of the individual
mandate but—by insisting that the limiting principle issue be resolved—also may
have pressured the Court into abandoning
the established practice by which it develops constitutional doctrine. In this way,
the evocative broccoli hypothetical and
related popular constitutional arguments
not only affected the substance of the constitutional principles the Court considered
in NFIB but also the process by which it
worked through the doctrinal standard
that emerged from the ruling.
If one values the benefits of the common law, inductive approach to shaping
constitutional principles in the courts, this
little appreciated dynamic of popular constitutionalism may be cause for concern.
FALL 2013 [ 5 ]
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The tools of constitutional decisionmaking
in the judicial realm are—and we suggest should be—distinct from the tools of
constitutional claim making that tend to
resonate outside the courts. The Court’s
premature engagement with limiting principles bypassed the benefits of its ordinary
incremental, case-by-case analysis and
circumvented institutional synergies that
can generate superior and more democratically legitimate outcomes when courts
and legislatures work together to flesh out
constitutional judgments over time.
■
MARK ROSEN
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
Articles
Religious Institutions, Liberal States, and the Political Architecture of Overlapping Spheres, __ University of Illinois Law Review __ (forthcoming).
The Educational Autonomy of Perfectionist Religious Groups in a Liberal State, 1 Journal of Law,
Religion and State 16 (2012) (symposium).
The SPEECH Act’s Unfortunate Parochialism: Of
Libel Tourism and Legitimate Pluralism, 53 Virginia
Journal of International Law 99 (2012) (invited symposium contribution)
The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican Legitimacy, 54 William and Mary Law Review
371 (2012).
Congress’ Primary Role in Determining What Full
Faith and Credit Requires: An Additional Argument, 41 California Western International Law Review 7 (2011).
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From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 Minnesota Law
Review 1051 (2010).

Book Contributions
Evaluating Tribal Courts’ Interpretations of the Indian Civil Rights Act, in The Indian Civil Rights Act
at 40 (A. Riley et al. eds., UCLA American Indian
Studies Center 2012).

CHRISTOPHER SCHMIDT
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
Articles
The Challenge of Supreme Court Biography: The
Case of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Constitutional
Commentary (forthcoming).
Explaining the Baseball Revolution, __ Arizona
State Law Journal __ (forthcoming).
Beyond the Opinion: Supreme Court Justices and
Extrajudicial Speech, 88 Chicago-Kent Law Review
487 (2013) (symposium editor).
Conceptions of Law in the Civil Rights Movement, 1
UC Irvine Law Review 641 (2011).
The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly 193 (2011).

Book Contributions
American Legal History, 1920–1970, in A Companion to American Legal History (S. Hadden & A. Brophy eds., Wiley-Blackwell 2013).
Defending the Right to Discriminate: The Libertarian Challenge to the Civil Rights Movement, in
Signposts: New Directions in Southern Legal History
(S. Hadden & P. Minter eds., University of Georgia
Press 2013).

{Property Rights}

DIGNITY TAKINGS

ADDRESSING THE LEGACY OF LAND
DISPOSSESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA

forthcoming from Oxford University Press
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Bernadette Atuahene
Associate Professor of Law

BA, University of California, Los Angeles
JD, Yale Law School
MPA, Harvard University

B

ernadette Atuahene has varied experiences in the field of law and international development. During law school, she worked as a legal consultant for the World Bank
and as a human rights investigator for the Center for Economic and Social Rights, where
she received Amnesty International’s Patrick Stewart Human Rights Award for her work
with human rights organizations throughout South America.
After law school, Professor Atuahene was in South Africa as a Fulbright Scholar. She
served as a judicial clerk at the Constitutional Court of South Africa, working for Justices
Madala and Ngcobo. She then practiced as an associate at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton in New York, where she focused on sovereign debt and real estate transactions.
Professor Atuahene joined the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty in 2005. She teaches Law,
Policy and International Development; Property; and International Business Transactions. In 2007 she was selected to become a Faculty Fellow at the American Bar Foundation. She also won the Law and Public Affairs Fellowship and was a visiting assistant
professor at Princeton University for the 2011–12 academic year.
Broadly, Professor Atuahene’s research deals with the confiscation and restitution of
property. In 2008 she won the Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship and worked with the South African Director General of Land Affairs and his
staff. The following summary is from her forthcoming book about the Land Restitution
Program, which is based on 150 interviews she conducted of program beneficiaries. She
is also directing and producing a documentary film about one family’s struggle to reclaim
their land.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/batuahene
www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/batuahene.
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Dignity Takings:

Addressing the Legacy of Land Dispossession
in South Africa
BY BERNADETTE ATUAHENE

A

danna came into this world
swaddled in apartheid’s indignities.
Adanna’s father was a white farm
owner and her birth mother was one of his
African farm hands. When Adanna’s birth
mother died, her father abruptly dropped
her off in Kliptown—a town about 35 kilometers from Johannesburg—to live with
an African woman named Ma Zwane and
her son. That is the last time either Adanna or Ma Zwane laid eyes on the man. Ma
Zwane eventually adopted Adanna and
she became a full-fledged member of the
Zwane family.
Ma Zwane was a nurse. When looking at one of her pictures you see a middle-aged woman, lips full with pride,
smooth dark skin impervious to the wrinkles time etches. Although the South African apartheid state made it especially difficult for Africans to own property in the
cities, Ma Zwane was unbowed. She saved
her modest earnings and eventually purchased two properties in Kliptown. Her
properties brought in a steady stream of
rental income and also earned her respect

and social standing among her neighbors
in Kliptown—a tight knit, cosmopolitan
community where Africans, Indians, Chinese, whites, and coloureds lived side by
side.
Ma Zwane dreamed that Adanna
would one day secure an education that
could shield her from the physical and
mental violence that apartheid heaped on
people kissed by the sun. So, when Adanna finished standard eight (grade 10),
Ma Zwane enrolled her in a commercial
course where she learned shorthand and
typewriting. Unfortunately, despite her education and specialized training, Adanna’s
brown skin prevented her from advancing.
“I could not get a job because at the time
they were not hiring non-whites in the
offices to do all that, and as a result there
was nothing else I could do but go to the
factory.” As the dreams Ma Zwane wove
for Adanna began to unstitch, she prayed
that the properties could provide Adanna
with the extra layer of protection that she
so desperately needed as a black woman
living under South Africa’s apartheid re-

*A summary of Bernadette Atuahene’s forthcoming book, Dignity Takings: Addressing the Legacy of
Land Dispossession in South Africa, to be published by Oxford University Press in 2014.
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gime. But, after Ma Zwane died in 1955,
Adanna’s life began to unravel.
To execute its white supremacist agenda of subordination and separation, in
1963, the South African apartheid government proclaimed that only Europeans
could inhabit Kliptown. Soon after, the
government uprooted Adanna and her
neighbors and relocated them to townships designated for their specific racial
and ethnic groups. After forcing Adanna
and her brother to move to Soweto (the
township designated for Africans), the
government demolished the two properties that they inherited from Ma Zwane
and gave them only nominal compensation. With a heavy heart Adanna observed, “when you own something, you
feel proud that you have got something.
But, when they take that away from
you, feel naked. . . . You feel as if you are
stripped naked. You are nothing.”1 The
bulldozers that razed Kliptown did not
just demolish physical buildings, they destroyed Adanna’s vibrant community, stole
her inheritance, and denied her dignity.
Most importantly, the destruction and relocation were part of the apartheid regime’s
strategy to subjugate blacks and cement
their position as sub-persons in the polity.
South Africa is not the only nation
where one group of people has subjugated
another and stripped them of their property and dignity. Other examples include
the Nazi confiscation of property from
Jews during World War II; the US expropriation of Japanese property during their
internment; the Hutu taking of property
from Tutsis during and after the genocide;
the US, Canadian, and Australian commandeering of native peoples’ property;
the European usurpation of property
from native peoples during colonialism
and apartheid; Idi Amin’s banishment of
Confidential interview, Gauteng, South Africa
(2008).
1
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people of Indian descent from Uganda
and the confiscation of their property; and
Saddam Hussein’s seizing of property from
the Kurds in Iraq.
The list is long, but when the wars
stopped, apartheid and colonialism fell,
the dictatorships ended, and the genocides
halted, the governments that emerged
from the ashes had to navigate the perilous landscape surrounding the return
of land and other property to displaced
or decimated populations. These nations
had a choice: they could ignore the fact
that people were deprived of their property, or they could address it. Many states
addressed past property dispossession
by providing a remedy. A comprehensive
remedy, however, addresses the full spectrum of damage done by the dispossession.
In certain instances, the damage is extensive because the dispossession is part
of a larger strategy to further subjugate a
certain group within the polity by denying
their humanity or their capacity to reason.
This type of dispossession is what I call
dignity takings, which is when a state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates
property rights from owners or occupiers
who it deems to be sub-persons without
paying just compensation or without a
legitimate public purpose. Dignity restoration is a comprehensive remedy that
compensates people for the physical assets
confiscated while also addressing the dignity deprivations involved.
International law and most programs
aimed at remedying past property seizures
have focused on reparations rather than
dignity restoration. (See Atuahene, “From
Reparation to Restoration...,” 60 SMU
Law Review 1419 (2007); Scott Leckie,
“Housing and Property Issues for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons...,”
19 Refugee Survey Quarterly 5 (2000).)
Reparations is “the right to have restored

Dignity Takings

to them property of which they were deto its black citizens. (See South Africa’s
prived in the course of the conflict and
Department of Land Affairs Annual Report,
to be compensated appropriately for any
2001–2002 (2002).) Using the South Afrisuch property that cannot be restored
can land restitution process as a case, the
to them.” (United Nations, Report of the
central question that the book considers
Committee on the Elimination of Racial
is: when there has been a dignity taking,
Discrimination (1996).) While reparations what does dignity restoration require?
involve reimbursement for the properThe primary data source was 141 inty taken, dignity restoration is based on
depth, semi-structured interviews of peoprinciples of restorative justice and thus
ple from Johannesburg, Cape Town and
seeks to rehabilitate the dispossessed and
surrounding areas who participated in the
reintegrate them into the fabric of sociSouth African land restitution program.
ety. As John Braithwaite states, restorative
In addition, the book relies on secondary
justice is interested in “restoring property
sources such as government documents,
loss, restoring injury, restoring a sense of
books, newspapers and academic articles;
security, restoring
26 semi-structured
dignity, restoring
interviews of offi“This type of dispossession
a sense of empowcials working for
is
what
I
call
dignity
takings,
erment, restoring
the South African
which is when a state directly land claims comdeliberate democracy, restoring har- or indirectly destroys or
mission; and parmony based on a
ticipant observation
confiscates
property
rights
feeling that justice
I conducted while
has been done, and from owners or occupiers
occupying an office
restoring social
in the Central Land
whom
it
deems
to
be
subsupport.” (“RestorClaims Commission
ative Justice...,” 25
persons without paying just in Pretoria in 2008.
Crime and Justice
compensation or without a
1 (1999).) When
art I of the book
reparations and
introduces and
legitimate public purpose.”
restorative justice
defines the book’s
are married, dignity restoration is the offfirst central concept—dignity takings. Usspring of this formidable union.
ing insights from social contract theory,
Most states that have addressed past
the first chapter develops the theoretical
property violations have not undertaken
framework for dignity takings. To demondignity restoration because it is a more
strate empirically how dignity takings untime-consuming, complicated and exfolded in South Africa, the second chapter
pensive remedy than reparations. South
uses respondents’ accounts of their lives
Africa’s colonial and apartheid era land
before the forced removals and how the
dispossessions are a quintessential examapartheid state displaced them from their
ple of dignity takings, and the post-aparthomes and property. The central finding
heid government is unique because it
is that dignity takings in South Africa inhas tried to move beyond reparations to
volved deprivations of wealth, agency and
facilitate dignity restoration. It understood community.
its land restitution program as an opporPart II of the book introduces and
tunity to restore wealth as well as dignity
defines the book’s second central con-

P
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cept, dignity restoration, and investigates
whether or not the South African land
restitution process facilitated it. In the
third chapter, interviews of commission
employees provide their perspective of
how the restitution program was supposed
to operate in theory and how it actually
worked in practice. This perspective is
counterpoised with a description of how
the process worked based on interviews
of respondents, who each went through
the land restitution process. Two stories
emerge from this double-sided analysis.
One story is about how the ever-looming
deadline to finalize all the claims impaired
the commission’s ability to effectively address the deprivations of wealth, agency
and community. The other story is about
how dispossessed people were often overwhelmed and unable to smoothly navigate
their way through the complicated restitution process because they did not have the
financial resources, knowledge, networks,
or assistance from civil society organizations necessary to hold the commission
accountable when it was not acting in
their interest or strictly in accordance with
the relevant laws.
The fourth chapter explains why a
sustained conversation between commission officials and respondents increased
the state’s capacity to address deprivations
of wealth, agency and community and
thereby facilitate dignity restoration. Unfortunately, the communication strategy
adopted by the commission was susceptible to communication breakdowns that
obstructed these important conversations.
Since there were about 80,000 claims filed,
respondents who had the power to demand the attention of commission officials
had their voices heard while those who
could not were silenced.
The fifth chapter explores the ways
in which the restitution awards affected
respondents’ wealth and dignity. It de[ 12 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

scribes the circumstances under which the
restitution awards increased respondents’
net worth. The chapter then explores how
respondents created meaning by using
the awards in ways that they felt honored
those who suffered dignity takings, but
died before they received justice.
The book concludes by moving the
discussion from the South African case
back to the global stage. While history is
replete with instances where communities
and individuals were subject to dignity
takings as a result of war, political turmoil,
dictatorships, or colonial regimes, when
dignity takings occur in the future, international organizations, bureaucrats, policy
makers, NGOs and intellectuals can use
the South African experience to shed light
on how to facilitate dignity restoration. ■
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
Books
Dignity Takings: Addressing the Legacy of Land Dispossession in South Africa (Oxford University Press,
forthcoming 2014).

Articles
Was the South African Land Restitution Process
Fair?: A Bottom-Up Assessment of the State’s Attempt to Address the Legacy of Land Dispossession,
currently under review at Law and Social Inquiry.
Paying for the Past: Addressing Past Property Violations in South Africa, 45 Law and Society Review
955 (2011).
South Africa’s Land Reform Crisis: Eliminating the
Legacy of Apartheid, 90 Foreign Affairs 121 (July/
August 2011).
Property and Transitional Justice, 58 UCLA Law Review Discourse 65 (2010).
Property Rights & the Demands of Transformation, 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 765
(2010).
Things Fall Apart: The Illegitimacy of Property
Rights in the Context of Past Theft, 51 Arizona Law
Review 829 (2009).

{History of Civil Rights and Liberties}

SECTION 1983 IS BORN
THE INTERLOCKING SUPREME COURT
STORIES OF TENNEY AND MONROE

forthcoming in Lewis & Clark Law Review, volume 17
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Sheldon Nahmod
Distinguished Professor of Law

BA, University of Chicago
JD, LLM, Harvard Law School
MA, Religious Studies, University of Chicago
Divinity School

S

heldon Nahmod is a well-known expert on constitutional law, civil rights and the
law of Section 1983. He is the author of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation: The
Law of Section 1983 (4th ed. 2011; 3 vols.); A Section 1983 Civil Rights Anthology (1993);
a casebook, Constitutional Torts (3d ed. 2010, with Wells and Eaton); and numerous law
review articles. He has argued civil rights cases in the U.S. Supreme Court and many
other federal courts. In addition, he lectures regularly on civil rights matters to federal
judges and attorneys throughout the country. He also lectures to lay groups on constitutional law.
Professor Nahmod practiced with a corporate law firm and was a legal services
staff attorney before entering academia. He also was a teaching fellow at Harvard Law
School. After joining IIT Chicago-Kent, he served as associate dean for three years, and
was named IIT Distinguished Professor in 1992.
Professor Nahmod has served as chair of the Section on Civil Rights, the Section on
Law and Education, and the Section on Law and Religion of the Association of American Law Schools. In 2001, he received the Jefferson Fordham Lifetime Achievement
Award for his work in Section 1983 jurisprudence from the American Bar Association’s
section on State and Local Government Law. He founded and for many years co-directed the Institute for Law and the Humanities.
Professor Nahmod blogs on Section 1983, constitutional law and other law-related
topics at nahmodlaw.com
nahmodlaw.com.
For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/snahmod.
www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/snahmod

[ 14 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

Section 1983 Is Born:

The Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of
Tenney and Monroe
BY SHELDON NAHMOD

S

ection 1983 famously provides a federal damages remedy against state
and local government officials and
local governments for violations of constitutional rights. Frequently used by litigants to promote constitutional accountability, it generates considerable litigation
in the federal courts. It has also been, and
remains, a vehicle for the articulation of
much constitutional law. Although section
1983 was enacted in 1871, it was largely
dormant for many decades because of restrictive interpretations of state action and
the Fourteenth Amendment.
It was only in 1951, when the seminal decision in Tenney v. Brandhove was
handed down, that the Supreme Court for
the first time expressly interpreted the language of section 1983.
Tenney arrived at the Court in 1950
when Harry Truman was President and as
the Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union was heating up. Both
countries were allies during the Second
World War but in the immediate postwar years an “Iron Curtain” (to use the

famous metaphor of Winston Churchill)
had descended over Europe. The Soviet
Union exacerbated the relationship by using spies against the United States to steal
the science of the atomic bomb, leading
to the Soviet Union’s testing of an atomic
bomb in 1949. As a result of these and
other factors, including the Korean War
that began in 1950, anti-Communism
sentiment began to pervade American
politics and society generally. At the national level this was exemplified by the
activities of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities and the growth
of McCarthyism, a particularly strident
form of political anti-Communism.
In 1949, William Brandhove, the
plaintiff in Tenney and an admitted Communist, sued members of the California
Senate’s Fact-Finding Committee on
Un-American Activities, the so-called
“Tenney Committee,” under section
1983 for $250,000 in connection with
his having been summoned as a witness
at a hearing on un-American activities.
The plaintiff alleged that the hearing was

*Excerpted from Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Is Born: The Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of Tenney
and Monroe, forthcoming in volume 17 of the Lewis & Clark Law Review (2013).
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conducted without a legitimate legislative
purpose but rather to intimidate and deter
him in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district
court dismissed for failure to state a claim
but the Ninth Circuit reversed even while
expressing doubt that the plaintiff would
ultimately prevail on the merits. It held
that the plaintiff could inquire into whether the members of the Tenney Committee
had an impermissible purpose, and thus
abused their powers, in conducting the
hearing in violation of plaintiff ’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The fact that the case was granted certiorari was not surprising: the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tenney, if left standing,
had the potential to hamper, if not undermine altogether, state legislative investigations into domestic Communism and
Communist subversion. In addition, as the
defendants pointed out in their Petition, to
the extent that federal courts could inquire
into legislative motivation, separation of
powers concerns were directly implicated.
This would threaten long-standing Congressional investigations into Communist
subversion.
Tenney pitted two influential Supreme
Court justices, Felix Frankfurter and William Douglas, against one another in majority and dissenting opinions, respectively. Justice Frankfurter, a former Harvard
Law School professor and outspoken civil
rights and liberties proponent appointed
to the Court by President Roosevelt, had
become an unremitting advocate of federalism, deference to politically accountable
bodies and judicial restraint, as reflected
in his majority opinion in Tenney. In contrast, Justice Douglas, a former Columbia
Law School and Yale Law School professor, a former chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and similarly
an appointee of President Roosevelt, was
an ardent proponent of individual rights
[ 16 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

who had relatively little concern for federalism and was the sole dissenter in Tenney.

“Tenney and Monroe demonstrate that the early and deep
tension between individual
rights and federalism was present at the very beginning of
section 1983 jurisprudence.”

T

en years later, in 1961, the Court
handed down another seminal section 1983 decision in Monroe v. Pape, a
case brought by an African-American
involving alleged police misconduct.
Monroe arose in the post–Brown v. Board
of Education period when concern with
domestic Communist subversion was still
present but diminished, and the nation’s
attention was increasingly focused on
racial discrimination. There had already
been highly publicized violence as well as
marches on Little Rock, Arkansas and on
Montgomery and Selma, Alabama. But in
the 1960’s the pace and intensity of such
demonstrations (led by Martin Luther
King, Jr. and others), together with the
violent Southern responses to them, were
to increase markedly and eventually give
rise to the creation of an effective political
coalition supporting racial equality.
Monroe dealt with the section 1983
cause of action itself, the Fourteenth
Amendment and with local government
liability. The plaintiffs, African-American
James Monroe and his family (including
young children), alleged in their 1959 lawsuit that, in the early morning of October
29, 1958, thirteen Chicago police officers
broke into their home, “routed them
from bed, made them stand naked in the
living room, and ransacked every room,
emptying drawers and ripping mattress
covers.” They also alleged that the police

Section 1983 Is Born

officers had leveled racial insults. James
Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on “open charges” for
ten hours, was interrogated in connection
with a murder, was not taken before a
magistrate, was not permitted to call his
family or attorney and was subsequently
released with no charges brought against
him. He claimed that the police officers,
who had no search or arrest warrant, violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Using section 1983, he sued
them for damages and also sued the City
of Chicago for damages expressly using
a respondeat superior theory. The district
court dismissed the complaint and the
Seventh Circuit, relying on its decision in
Stift v. Lynch, affirmed on the ground that
the alleged misconduct of a city’s police
officers did not make a “sufficient showing
of a violation” of section 1983.
Justice Douglas’s clerk, Steven B. Duke,
recommended granting certiorari not only
because there was a circuit split, but also
because the Seventh Circuit’s decision (a
“bafflement”) had simply ignored section
1983. The local government liability issue,
though, was apparently collateral in Duke’s
view. Duke further commented that he
could find no extended discussion in the
legislative history of “color of law.”
In Monroe, which was only the second
Supreme Court decision interpreting section 1983, Justices Frankfurter and Douglas were again on opposite sides. But this
time it was Justice Douglas who wrote the
majority opinion. His opinion emphasized
individual rights, rejected the defendants’
federalism contentions, expansively interpreted section 1983 and ruled for the
plaintiff against police officers. In contrast,
Justice Frankfurter wrote an extensive,
and aggressive, partial dissent on the color
of law issue, emphasizing federalism.
Section 1983 jurisprudence was born
in these two interlocking cases. At the

outset, the stories of Tenney and Monroe
must be understood in the political and
social settings in which they arose. The
Cold War and anti-Communist sentiment situate Tenney while the Civil Rights
movement and the post–Brown era situate
Monroe. The stories also emerge from the
parties’ petitions for certiorari and briefs
in Tenney and Monroe, and in Monroe’s
oral argument, as well as the papers of Justices Frankfurter and Douglas and in their
majority and dissenting opinions. In particular, Justice Frankfurter, as an advocate
of federalism, played an outsized role in
both decisions.
Tenney and Monroe demonstrate that the
early and deep tension between individual
rights and federalism—a tension that began
with the Fourteenth Amendment and continues to this day—was present at the very
beginning of the development of the Supreme Court’s section 1983 jurisprudence.  ■
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Distinguished Professor of Law

BA, University of Rochester
JD, Harvard Law School

J

oan Steinman’s scholarly work always has focused on the operation of the federal
courts, sometimes on aspects of complex litigation such as class actions and multidistrict litigation, but often on matters of subject-matter jurisdiction. She created a body
of scholarship focused on jurisdictional issues that were complicated by their situation/
embedding in cases that were removed from state court and therefore were governed by
the interplay between the core jurisdictional statutes and the removal and remand statutes.
In recent years, Professor Steinman has expanded her work to address important issues of
appellate jurisdiction, practice and procedure. Thus, she has written about the constitutionality and propriety of appellate courts’ resolving issues in the first instance, standing
to appeal and the right to defend a judgment in the federal courts, the appellate rights of
persons who are not full-fledged parties, “hypothetical jurisdiction” in the federal appellate courts, and pendent appellate jurisdiction. She also co-authored a casebook, Appellate
Courts: Structures, Functions, Processes and Personnel (LexisNexis 2d ed., 2006 and 2009
Supplement) (with Daniel J. Meador and Thomas E. Baker).
In her most recent article, which—at this writing—is under submission to law reviews, Professor Steinman brings her careful and thorough analysis to the question: under
what circumstances, if any, should federal courts of appeals review a denial of summary judgment, after a case has gone to trial and judgment? This is an issue on which the
federal intermediate courts of appeals are split; an issue that the Supreme Court viewed as
important enough to grant certiorari on; and an issue that the Court ended up addressing
poorly and only in dicta, leading to a further circuit split on the effect of its decision.
www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/jsteinman
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/jsteinman.

[ 20 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

Pre- and Post-Judgment Review

of Summary Judgment Denials after Ortiz v. Jordan:
A Wider and Deeper Look
BY JOAN STEINMAN

I

am not a fan of motions for summary
judgment. Nonetheless, I write here in
support of the post-trial, post-judgment appealability of denials of summary
judgment, in limited circumstances. We
sometimes should allow appeals of denials, as well as grants, of such judgments,
just as we allow appeals of all other orders
that may constitute harmful error.
Ordinarily, when a court denies a motion for summary judgment, the denial is
not immediately appealable. It merely results in the case proceeding. The denial is
immediately appealable only if it satisfies
a common law or statutory exception to
the final judgment rule, such as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a) or § 1292(b) or mandamus. In
most cases, the first opportunity to appeal
a denial of summary judgment will arise
after final judgment.
However, when a motion for summary judgment was based on a defendant’s
absolute or qualified immunity from suit,
denial of the motion may be appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. Then,
an immediate appeal from the denial

is available when the appeal presents a
“purely legal issue” such as what clearly
established law was at the time of defendant’s challenged actions, but an immediate interlocutory appeal is not available
when the denial of summary judgment
rested on the district judge’s conclusion
that factual issues, genuinely in dispute,
precluded summary judgment. If the defendant fails to take the immediate appeal,
or if that appeal is rejected on non-merits
grounds such as untimeliness, the defendant will want to appeal the denial of
summary judgment after final judgment
against him.
This Article addresses whether defendants who fail to take an available
pre-judgment appeal of a summary judgment denial waive the right to appeal the
denial after trial and final judgment. It
also addresses whether defendants who
did not waive the right to appeal the denial, including those who had no opportunity to take a pre-judgment appeal, may
do so after trial and final judgment. Prior
to Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884 (2011),

*Excerpted from Joan Steinman, Pre- and Post-Judgment Review of Summary Judgment Denials after Ortiz v.
Jordan: A Wider and Deeper Look, currently pending publication.
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all federal appeals courts held that, as a
general rule, they would not entertain
post-trial, post-judgment appeals of summary judgment denials. But some made a
“legal question exception.” The Supreme
Court perceived the circuits to have divided, and granted certiorari in Ortiz v.
Jordan to resolve the question whether a
party may appeal an order denying summary judgment after a district court has
conducted a full trial on the merits.
The Court immediately answered with
an unqualified “no.” But that was dicta;
the Court actually declined to address the
question that it perceived had split the circuits, because in this case, the Court concluded, the denial of summary judgment
rested on genuine issues of material fact.
So, what should the law be?

F

irst, when interlocutory appeals of
denials of summary judgment are permitted, those appeals should be permissive, rather than mandatory, as the federal
intermediate appellate courts nearly unanimously hold.
When interlocutory appeals of summary judgment denials are not available,
or when they are available but are permissive and not taken, such appeals should
be permitted when summary judgment
was denied based on the court’s decision
of a question of law, but not when it was
denied based on a finding that there were
genuine issues of material fact. Reviewing
a denial of summary judgment after trial
is inappropriate in the latter instance because it is appropriate to view the factual
base on which the motion was decided as
superseded by the evidence adduced at
trial, and “a judgment after a full trial is
superior to a pretrial decision because the
factfinder’s verdict depends on credibility
assessments that a pretrial paper record
simply cannot allow.” Chesapeake Paper
Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp.,
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51 F.3d 1229, 1236 (4th Cir. 1995). But if
a court denies summary judgment based
on its view of the law, the above reasoning does not apply. Moreover, the district
court settles something about the merits
of the claim; the denial decides more than
that the case should go to trial. Indeed, it
is making law of the case, which the parties may be permitted to challenge in the
district court only on limited grounds.
There are good reasons to permit
post-trial, post-judgment review of a denial of summary judgment when the question to be posed is a question of law and
the issue presented on appeal has not been
mooted. First, the task of determining
the bases on which summary judgment
was denied and whether those bases are
“legal” or “factual” is no longer “dubious,”
if it ever was. Since at least the Supreme
Court’s decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 313 (1995), courts of appeals
have had to decide whether a summary
judgment denial was based on the court’s
conclusion that genuine issues of material
fact precluded summary judgment or on
the court’s legal conclusions concerning
whether the undisputed facts gave defendant an immunity from suit. Johnson
required this determination because the
Supreme Court there held that only in
the latter circumstance is an interlocutory
appeal of the denial available under the
collateral order doctrine. Johnson v. Jones
explicitly rejected the argument that the
line that the Court was requiring courts
of appeals to draw would be “unworkable”
and overly difficult. In addition, courts of
appeals routinely categorize issues as questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law, for purposes of
determining the appropriate standard of
review. Federal courts of appeals thus have
had plenty of practice in making these
“law” vs. “fact” distinctions.
Moreover, appellate courts’ greater

Pre- and Post-Judgment Review of Summary Judgment Denials

expertise (than trial courts) in deciding
questions of law joins with the policies
that support the final judgment rule (postponing appeal until district court processing of a case has been completed) to argue
for post-judgment review of law-based
summary judgment denials.
A number of circuits rationalized their
refusal to entertain post-trial, post-judgment appeals from denials of motions for
summary judgment by asserting that the
proper remedy for an erroneous denial
of summary judgment was either interlocutory appeal or a Rule 50 motion for
judgment as a matter of law. But interlocutory appeals often are not available and,
in our federal system, are disfavored when
an adequate remedy for an error can be
provided after final judgment. Once a final
judgment has been entered, the aggrieved
party may draw into question on appeal all
prior orders that led to the final judgment.
As for Rule 50 motions, if the question
that would be posed after trial is no different from the question that was posed by
the motion for summary judgment, it is
not self-evident why a redundant motion
should be necessary. What good reason is
there to impose the procedural burden of
requiring a party to raise again the same
legal points that it made in its summary
judgment motion? The better rule is that a
litigant should not need to preserve legal
arguments that it made in its motion for
summary judgment by filing Rule 50 motions reiterating the point. And it would
seem to be inconsistent with law-of-thecase doctrine to demand that litigants
who lost on a legal point made in support
of their motion for summary judgment
raise that legal argument again in a Rule
50 motion for judgment as a matter of law.
While we may permit parties to seek reconsideration of prior interlocutory orders
including denials of summary judgment,
that is not to say that we do or should re-

quire parties to do so.
Even more importantly perhaps, it
turns out that Rule 50 motions are not an
appropriate vehicle to raise the legal issues
on which summary judgment motions
may have foundered. A Rule 50(a) motion
is made, in a jury trial, when the party

“When interlocutory appeals of
denials of summary judgment
are permitted, those appeals
should be permissive, rather
than mandatory, as the federal
intermediate appellate courts
nearly unanimously hold.”
against whom judgment is sought has rested its case; the motion is based on the trial
record to that point. The movant argues
that “a reasonable jury would not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find
for the [non-moving] party on [a particular] issue,” and that the court should
resolve that issue against the non-moving
party and grant judgment as a matter of
law against the non-moving party because
an identified claim or defense cannot be
maintained without a finding on that issue
favorable to the non-moving party. Rule
50 thus focuses exclusively on the circumstances in which a reasonable jury would
not have a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis to find for the non-moving party on
one or more issues, and explicitly ties the
conclusion that one party is entitled to
judgment to the absence of sufficient evidence to allow victory for the other side.
(It corresponds to that portion of Rule 56
that focuses on whether genuine issues of
material fact are posed.)
Rule 50(b) provides that when the
jmol motion is not granted, the court submits the action to the jury “subject to a
FALL 2013 [ 23 ]

Joan Steinman

later determination of the legal questions
raised by the motion.” But if the legal
questions raised by the motion go only
to whether the evidence was sufficient to
go to the jury, then nothing in Rule 50(b)
supports the proposition that a Rule 50
motion properly may be the vehicle to
seek and receive judgment as a matter of
law based on purely legal issues.

I

s there merit to insistence upon the
aggrieved party doing something more
than failing with its summary judgment
motion, to preserve the issue for appeal?
It is said that reviving the issue in some
manner would help to avoid surprise to
the appellee, and could give the trial court
an opportunity to revisit its earlier ruling.
However, I don’t know why raising on
appeal the legal rulings made in support
of the denial of a motion for summary
judgment should come as a surprise to the
prevailing party. The making of summary judgment motions and the writing of
memoranda in support of and in opposition to such motions is a lengthy, onerous
and expensive process. Given this reality,
it is not as though the legal points made
in connection with a summary judgment
motion “fly under the radar,” and might
bite an unsuspecting adversary after final
judgment. Nor will the motion for summary judgment likely have been made and
briefed so long before a case went to trial
and judgment that opposing counsel will
have forgotten about it.
Nor do I see any unfairness to the prevailing party in having to defend its judgment against contentions that a ruling on
the law, on which the denial of summary
judgment was predicated, was erroneous
and harmed the losing party. Any prejudicial error in the proceedings below can
nullify the judgment, whether that error
was made in rulings on pleadings, rulings
on discovery, or rulings at trial. To grant
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review to the summary judgment denial
and to reverse the judgment would not
be unjust to the party that was victorious
after all the evidence was in, for the appellate court would be deciding that, under
the law, the prevailing party below was not
entitled to win; indeed, if the court were
to reverse, it would be deciding that his
adversary had been entitled to win, as a
matter of law, on his motion for summary
judgment.
In some circumstances, a consistent
failure to object to the admission of evidence that would be irrelevant on the appellant’s theory of the case, as marshaled
in its summary judgment motion and
memoranda in support, might support
a holding that the appellant had waived
or not “preserved” the error. A failure to
offer evidence in support of the summary
judgment movant’s theory of the case also
could be damaging. Similarly, a failure to
object to jury instructions that were inconsistent with the theory of the summary
judgment motion or a failure to propose
jury instructions that would apply the
theory of the summary judgment motion
might warrant support for a holding that
the appellant had waived or not “preserved” the error. Perhaps other acts or
omissions might support the same result.
But appellate courts should not bar appeals from law-based summary judgment
denials on these grounds until the appeals
courts have given litigants advance warning of the acts and omissions that might
constitute waiver or failure to preserve—
so that such appellants do not become
the ones with just complaints of “unfair
surprise.” As of now, there is little law that
indicates what, if anything (other than making a Rule 50 motion), a litigant must do to
preserve for appeal the allegedly erroneous
denial of a law-based summary judgment
denial.
Also favoring review is the fact that

denial of post-judgment review to denials of summary judgment would inhibit
effective appellate court scrutiny of trial
court compliance with Rule 56. Moreover,
appeal from the denial of summary judgment will be timely so long as the appeal
from the final judgment was timely, so
there will be no need for any tolling of
the time to appeal, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court’s indication in Ortiz that
the time to appeal the summary judgment
denial in that case had long since run. ■
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New books by faculty

Lori Andrews

Edward Lee

I Know Who You Are and I Saw What You Did:
Social Networks and the Death of Privacy

The Fight for the Future: How People Defeated
Hollywood and Saved the Internet—For Now

(Free Press 2012, paperback 2013)

(Self-published, print and ebook, fall 2013)

How many things did you reveal
about yourself online today? As
many individuals have already
learned the hard way, the same
power of information sharing that
can topple governments can also
topple a person’s career, marriage,
finances, or even his or her future.
Prof. Andrews explores how our
digital identities on the Web—
email, personal websites, and social
media pages—are starting to overshadow our physical
identities. How can you protect the privacy of your digital
self? This book shows how people can fight back when
what they post on social networks is used against them.
Andrews also ignites a battle for further protections, from
a right to connect to a right to privacy, and proposes a
Social Network Constitution to protect us all.

Wikipedia went dark on January
18, 2012. So did thousands of other
websites, including search giant
Google, all to protest a controversial
copyright bill called the Stop Online
Piracy Act (SOPA). The protest even
helped to ignite mass demonstrations on the streets of over 250 cities
in all 27 countries of the European
Union to stop a similar attempt
to regulate the Internet under the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Prof. Lee’s
new book provides a gripping look at how people organized the largest Internet protest in history, plus the largest
single-day demonstration on the streets of 27 countries of
the European Union. In the end, this grassroots movement
won an unexpected, but historic first victory in the fight
for a “free and open Internet.”

Distinguished Professor of Law

Richard Warner
Professor of Law

Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online
Privacy and Security (with Robert H. Sloan)
(CRC Press, summer 2013)

Profs. Warner and Sloan—two
renowned experts on computer
security and law—explore the
well-established connection between social norms, privacy, security, and technological structure.
This approach is the key to understanding information security and
informational privacy, providing
a practical framework to address
ethical and legal issues. Bridging
the gap among computer scientists, economists, lawyers,
and public policy makers, this book provides technically
and legally sound public policy guidance about online
privacy and security. It emphasizes the need to make
trade-offs among the complex concerns that arise in the
context of online privacy and security.
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